An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding/Extended Contents

THE
CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.
Introduction.

SECT.

1. An Enquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.
2. Design.
3. Method.
4. Useful to know the extent of our Comprehension.
5. Our Capacity proportioned to our State and Concerns, to discover things useful to us.
6. Knowing the extent of our Capacities will hinder us from useless Curiosity, Scepticism, and Idleness.
7. Occasion of this Essay.
8. Apology for Idea.

CHAP. II.
No innate speculative Principles.

SECT.

1. The way shewn how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.
2. General Assent the great Argument.
3. Universal Consent proves nothing innate.
4. What is, is; and, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.
5. Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.
6, 7. That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason, answer'd.
8. If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.
9—11. 'Tis false that Reason discovers them.
12. The coming to the Use of Reason, not the time we come to know these Maxims.
13. By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.
14. If coming to the use of Reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.
15, 16. The steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.
17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.
18. If such an Assent be a mark of innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetness is not Bitterness; and a thousand the like must be innate.
19. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.
20. One and One, equal to Two, &c. not general nor useful, answered.
21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.
22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.
23. The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.
24. Not innate, because not universally assented to.
25. These Maxims not the first known.
26. And so not innate.
27. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shews it self clearest.
28. Recapitulation.

CHAP. III.
No innate practical Principles.

SECT.

1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally received, as the forementioned speculative Maxims.
2. Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all Men.
3. Obj. Though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, answered.
4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not innate.
5. Instance in keeping Compacts.
6. Vertue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable.
7. Men's Actions convince us, that the Rule of Vertue is not their internal Principle.
8. Conscience no proof of any innate Moral Rule.
9. Instances of Enormities practised without remorse.
10. Men have contrary practical Principles.
11—13. Whole Nations reject several Moral Rules.
14. Those who maintain innate practical Principles, tell us not what they are.
15—19. Lord Herbert's innate Principles examined.
20. Obj. Innate Principles may be corrupted, answered.
21. Contrary Principles in the World.
22—26. How men commonly come by their Principles.
27. Principles must be examined.

CHAP. IV.
Other Considerations about innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

SECT.

1. Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate.
2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with Children.
4, 5. Identity an Idea not innate.
6. Whole and Part not innate Ideas.
7. Idea of Worship not innate.
8—11. Idea of GOD not innate.
12. Suitable to GOD's Goodness, that all Men should have an Idea of Him, therefore naturally imprinted by Him; answered.
13—16. Ideas of GOD various in different Men.
17. If the Idea of GOD be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.
18. Idea of Substance not innate.
19. No Propositions can be innate, since Ideas are innate.
20. Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.
21. Difference of Men's Discoveries depends upon the different application of their Faculties.
22. Men must think and know for themselves.
23. Whence the Opinion of innate Principles.
24. Conclusion.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.
Of Ideas in general.

SECT.

1. Idea is the Object of Thinking.
2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflexion.
3. The Objects of Sensation one Sourse of Ideas.
4. The Operations of our Minds about sensible Ideas, the other Sourse of them.
5. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these.
6. Observable in Children.
7. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.
8. Ideas of Reflexion had later, because they need Attention.
9. The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive.
10. The Soul thinks not always; for, First, it wants Proofs.
11. Secondly, It is not always conscious of it.
12. Thirdly, If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two persons.
13. Fourthly, Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.
14. Fifthly, That Men dream without remembring it, in vain urged.
15. Sixthly, Upon their Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.
16. Seventhly, On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflexion, of of which there is no appearance.
17. Eightly, If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.
18. Ninthly, How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs proof.
19. Tenthly, That a Man should be busie in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.
20—24. No Ideas but from Sensation or Reflexion, evident, if we observe Children.
25. In the reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is most of all passive.

CHAP. II.
Of simple Ideas.

SECT.

1. Uncompounded Appearances.
2, 3. The Mind can neither make nor destroy them.

CHAP. III.
Of Ideas of one Sense.

SECT.

1. As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing.
2. Few simple Ideas have Names.

CHAP. IV.
Of Solidity.

SECT.

1. We receive this Idea from touch.
2. Solidity fills Space.
3. Distinct from Space.
4. From Hardness.
5. On Solidity depends Impulse, Resistence, and Protrusion.
6. What it is.

CHAP. V.
Of simple Ideas by more than one Sense.

CHAP. VI.
Of simple Ideas of Reflexion.

SECT.

1. Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas?
2. The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Reflexion.

CHAP. VII.
Of Simple Ideas, both of Sensation and Reflexion.

SECT.

1—6. Pleasure and Pain.
7. Existence and Unity.
8. Power.
9. Succession.
10. Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledge.

CHAP VIII.
Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas.

SECT.

1—6. Positive Ideas from privative Causes.
7, 8. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.
9, 10. Primary and Secondary Qualities.
11, 12. How primary Qualities, produce their Ideas.
13, 14. How Secondary.
15—23. Ideas of primary Qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not.
24, 25. Reason of our mistake in this.
26. Secondary Qualities two-fold; First, Immediately perceivable; Secondly, Mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX.
Of Perception.

SECT.

1. It is the first simple Idea of Reflexion.
2—4. Perception is only when the Mind receives the Impression.
5, 6. Children, though they have Ideas, in the Womb, have none innate.
7. Which Ideas first is not evident.
8—10. Ideas of Sensation often changed by the Judgment.
11—14. Perception puts the difference between Animals and inferior Beings.
15. Perception the inlet of Knowledge.

CHAP. X.
Of Retention.

SECT.

1. Contemplation.
2. Memory.
3. Attention, Repetition, Pleasure, and Pain fix Ideas.
4, 5. Ideas fade in the Memory.
6. Constantly repeated Ideas can scarce be lost.
7. In remembring the Mind is often active.
8. Two defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowness.
9. Brutes have Memory.

CHAP. XI.
Of Discerning, &c.

SECT.

1. No Knowledge without it.
2. The difference of Wit and Judgment.
4. Clearness alone hinders Confusion.
4. Comparing.
5. Brutes compare, but imperfectly.
6. Compounding.
7. Brutes compound but little.
8. Naming.
9. Abstraction.
10, 11. Brutes abstract not.
12, 13. Idiots and mad Men.
14. Method.
15. These are the beginnings of humane Knowledge.
16. Appeal to Experience.
17. Dark room.

CHAP. XII.
Of Complex Ideas.

SECT.

1. Made by the Mind out of simple ones.
2. Made voluntarily.
3. Are either Modes, Substances, or Relations.
4. Modes.
5. Simple and mixed Modes.
6. Substances Single or Collective.
7. Relation.
8. The abstrusest Ideas from the two Sources.

CHAP. XIII.
Of Space, and its simple Modes.

SECT.

1. Simple Modes.
2. Idea of Space.
3. Space and Extension.
4. Immensity.
5, 6. Figure.
7—10. Place.
11—14. Extension and Body not the same.
15—17. Substance which we know not, no proof against Space without Body.
18, 19. Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.
20. A Vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of Body.
21. The power of annihilation proves a Vacuum.
22. Motion proves a Vacuum.
23. The Ideas of Space and Body distinct.
24, 25. Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.
26. Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.
27. Men differ little in clear simple Ideas.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Duration.

SECT.

1. Duration is fleeting Extension.
2—4. Its Idea from Reflexion on the train of our Ideas.
5. The Idea of Duration applicable to Things whilst we sleep.
6—8. The Idea of Succession not from Motion.
9—11. The train of Ideas has a certain degree of quickness.
12. This train the measure of other Successions.
13—15. The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.
16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of Motion.
17. Time is Duration set out by Measures.
18. A good measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal periods.
19. The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the properest Measures of Time.
20. But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.
21. No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.
22. Time not the measure of Motion.
23. Minutes, Hours, and Tears, not necessary measures of Duration.
24. The measure of Time two ways applied.
25—27. Our measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.
28—31. Eternity.

CHAP. XV.
Of Duration and Expansion considered together

SECT.

1. Both capable of greater and less.
2. Expansion not bounded by Matter.
3. Nor Duration by Motion.
4. Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion.
5. Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion.
6. Time and Place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Body.
7. Sometimes for so much of either, as we design by measures taken from the bulk or motion of Bodies.
8. They belong to all Beings.
9. All the parts of Extension are Extension; and all the parts of Duration, are Duration.
10. Their parts inseparable.
11. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid.
12. Duration has never two parts together, Expansion altogether.

CHAP. XVI.
Of Number.

SECT.

1. Number the simplest and most universal Idea.
2. Its Modes made by Addition.
3. Each Mode distinct.
4. Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers the most precise.
5, 6. Names necessary to Numbers.
7. Why Children number not earlier.
8. Number measures all Measurables.

CHAP. XVII.
Of Infinity.

SECT.

1. Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.
2, 3. How we come by the Idea of Infinity.
4. Our Idea of Space boundless.
5. And so of Duration.
6. Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity.
7. Difference between infinity of Space, and Space infinite.
8. We have no Idea of infinite Space.
9. Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity.
10—11. Our different conception of the Infinity of Number, Duration, and Expansion.
12. Infinite Divisibility,
13, 14, 17, 18. No positive Idea of Infinite.
15, 16, 19. What is positive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite.
20. Some think they have a positive Idea of Eternity, and not Space.
21. Supposed positive Ideas of Infinity cause of Mistakes.
22. All these Ideas from Sensation and Reflexion.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of other simple Modes.

SECT.

1, 2. Modes of Motion.
3. Modes of Sounds.
5. Modes of Tastes.
7. Modes of Colours.
8. Why some Modes have, and others have not Names.

CHAP. XIX.
Of the Modes of Thinking.

SECT.

1, 2. Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.
3. The various attention of the Mind in Thinking.
4. Hence probable that Thinking is the Action, not Essence of the Soul.

CHAP. XX.
Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

SECT.

1. Pleasure and Pain simple Ideas.
2. Good and Evil what.
3. Our Passions moved by Good and Evil.
4. Love.
5. Hatred.
6. Desire.
7. Joy.
8. Sorrow.
9. Hope.
10. Fear.
11. Despair.
12. Anger.
13. Envy.
14. What Passions all Men have.
15, 16. Pleasure and Pain what.
17. Shame.
18. These instances to shew how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflexion.

CHP. XXI.
Of Power.

SECT.

1. This Idea how got.
2. Power active and passive.
3. Power includes Relation.
4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit.
5. Will and Understanding, two Powers.
6. Faculties.
7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
8—12. Liberty what.
9. Supposes the Understanding and Will.
10. Belongs not to Volition.
11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to Necessary.
13. Necessity what.
14—20. Liberty belong not to the Will.
21. But to the Agent or Man.
22—24. In respect of willing, a Man is not free.
25—28. The Will determined by something without it.
29. The greater apparent Good determines the Will.
30—32. This is a Perfection of humane Nature.
33. And takes not away Liberty.
34, 35. Why Men chuse differently.
36. Why they chuse amiss.
38. From the different appearance of Good.
39. And judging amiss on these Appearances.
40—42. First, in comparing present and future.
43. Secondly, In thinking wrong of the greatness or certainty of the Consequence of any Action.
44. Causes of wrong Judgment, Ignorance, Inadvertency, Sloth, Passion, Fashion, &c.
45. Preference of Vice to Vertue, a manifest wrong Judgment.
47. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXII.
Of Mixed Modes.

SECT.

1. Mixed Modes what.
2. Made by the Mind.
3. Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.
4. The Name ties the Parts of the mixed Modes into one Idea.
5. The Cause of making mixed Modes.
6. Why Words in one Language, have none answering in another.
7. And Languages change.
8. Mixed Modes, where they exist.
9. How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes.
10. Motion, Thinking and Power, have been most modified.
11. Several Words seeming to signifie Action, signifie but the Effect.
12. Mixed Modes, made also of other Ideas.

CHAP. XXIII.
Of the Complex Ideas of Substances.

SECT.

1. Ideas of Substances how made.
2. Our Idea of Substance in general.
3—6. Of the sorts of Substances.
4. No clear Idea of Substance in general.
5. As clear an Idea of Spirit, as Body.
7. Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.
8. And why.
9. Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Sustances.
10, 11. The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.
12. Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.
13. Conjecture about Spirits.
14. Complex Ideas of Substances.
15. Idea of spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily Substances.
16. No Idea of abstract Substance.
17. The Cohesion of solid Parts, and impulse the primary Ideas of Body.
18. Thinking and Motivity, the primary Ideas of Spirit.
19—21. Spirits capable of Motion.
22. Idea of Soul and Body compared.
23—27. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceived, as Thinking in a Soul.
28, 29. Communication of Motion by Impulse, or by Thought, equally intelligible.
30. Ideas of Body and Spirit compared.
31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it, than that of Body.
32. We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas.
33—35. Idea of God.
36. No Ideas in our Complex one of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflexion.
37. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXIV.
Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

SECT.

1. One Idea.
2. Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.
3. All artificial Things are collective Ideas.

CHAP. XXV.
Of Relation.

SECT.

1. Relation what.
2. Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceived.
3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.
4. Relation different from the Things related.
5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.
6. Relation only betwixt two Things.
7. All Things capable of Relation.
8. The Ideas of Relations clearer often, than of the Subjects related.
9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.
10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are Relative.
11. Conclusion.

CHAP. XXVI.
Of Cause of Effect, and other Relations.

SECT.

1. Whence their Ideas got.
2. Creation, Generation, making Alteration.
3, 4. Relations of Time.
5. Relations of Place and Extension.
6. Absolute Terms often stand for Relations.

CHAP. XXVII.
Of other Relations.

SECT.

1. Proportional.
2. Natural.
3. Instituted.
4. Moral.
5. Moral Good and Evil.
6. Moral Rules.
7. Laws.
8. Divine Law the measure of Sin and Duty.
9. Civil Law, the measure of Crimes and Innocence.
10, 11. Philosophical Law, the measure of Vertue and Vice.
12. Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Discredit.
13. These three Laws the Rules of moral Good and Evil.
14, 15. Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules.
16. The denominations of Actions often mislead us.
17. Relations innumerable.
18. All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.
19. We have ordinary as clear (or clearer) Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.
20. The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compared to, be true or false.

CHAP. XXVIII.
Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas.

SECT.

1. Ideas some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused.
2. Clear and Obscure, explained by Sight.
3. Causes of Obscurity.
4. Distinct and confused, what.
5. Objection.
6. Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.
7. Defaults which make Confusion. First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.
8. Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.
9. Thirdly, Or are mutable and undetermined.
10. Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.
11. Confusion concerns always two Ideas.
12. Causes of Confusion.
13. Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.
14. This if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.
15. Instance in Eternity.
16, 17. —Divisibility of Matter.

CHAP. XXIX.
Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

SECT.

1. Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.
2. Simple Ideas all real.
3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.
4. Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas are real.
5. Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of Things.

CHAP. XXX.
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

SECT.

1. Adequate Ideas, are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.
2. Simple Ideas all adequate.
3. Modes are all adequate.
4, 5. Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.
6, 7. Ideas of Substances, as referr'd to real Essences not adequate.
8—11. Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.
12. Simple Ideas 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and adequate.
13. Ideas of Substances are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, inadequate.
14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXI.
Of true and false Ideas.

SECT.

1. Truth and Falshood properly belongs to Propositions.
2. Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.
3. No Idea as an appearance in the Mind true or false.
4. Ideas referred to any thing may be true or false
5. Other Men's Ideas, real Existence, and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their Ideas to.
6—8. The cause of such references.
9. Simple Ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.
10. Ideas of mixed Modes most liable to be false in this sense.
11. Or at least to be thought false.
12. And why.
13. As referred to real Existences, none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.
14—16. First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.
15. Though one Man's Idea of Blue, should be different from another's.
17. Secondly, Modes not false.
18. Thirdly, Ideas of Substances are false, when the Combination is made of simple Ideas that do never co-exist; or has in it the negation of any one that does constantly coexist.
19. Truth or Falshood always supposes affirmation or negation.
20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.
21. But are false, First, when judged agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so.
22. Secondly, When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.
23. Thirdly, When judged adequate without being so.
24. Fourthly, When judged to represent the real Essence.
25. Ideas when false.
26. More properly to be called Right or Wrong.
27. Conclusion.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.
Of Words or Language in general.

SECT.

1. Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.
2. To make them signs of Ideas.
3, 4. To make general Signs.
5. Words ultimately derived from such as signifie sensible Ideas.
6. Distribution.

CHAP. II.
Of the Signification of Words.

LECT,

1. Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.
2, 3. Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.
4. Words often secretly referred, First, to the Ideas in other Men's Minds.
5. Secondly, To the reality of Things.
6. Words by use readily excite Ideas.
7. Words often used without signification.
8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.

CHAP. III.
Of general Terms.

SECT.

1. The greatest part of Words general.
2. For every particular thing to have a name is impossible.
3, 4. And useless.
5. What things have proper names.
6—8. How general Words are made.
9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.
10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.
11. General and universal are Creatures of the Understanding.
12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.
13. They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.
14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence.
15. Real and nominal Essence.
16. Constant connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.
17. Supposition that Species are distinguished by their real Essences useless.
18. Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas and Modes, different in Substances.
19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.
20. Recapitulation.

CHAP. IV.
Of the Names of simple Ideas.

SECT.

1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.
2. First, Names of simple Ideas and Substances, intimate real Existence.
3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signifie always both real and nominal Essence.
4. Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas undefinable.
5. If all were definable, 'twould be a process in infinitum.
6. What a Definition is.
7. Simple Ideas why undefinable.
8, 9. Instances Motion.
10. Light.
11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explained.
12, 13. The contrary shewed in complex Ideas by instances of a Statue and Rainbow.
14. The Names of complex Ideas when to be made intelligible by Words.
15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas least doubtful.
16. Fifthly, Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali.
17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.

CHAP. V.
Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

SECT.

1. They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.
2. First, The Ideas they stand for, are made by the Understanding.
3. Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.
4. How this is done.
5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence.
6. Instances Murther, Incest, Stabbing.
7. But still subservient to the end of Language.
8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a proof.
9. This shews Species to be made for Communication.
10, 11. In mixed Modes 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and make it a Species.
12. For the Originals of mixed Modes. we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.
13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.
14. Names of mixed Modes stand always for their real Essences.
15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.
16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject.

CHAP. VI.
Of the Names of Substances.

SECT.

1. The common Names of Substances stand for sorts.
2. The Essence of each sort is the abstract Idea.
3. The nominal and real Essence different.
4— 6. Nothing essential to Individuals.
7, 8. The nominal Essence bounds the Species.
9. Not the real Essence which we know not.
10. Not substantial forms which we know less.
11. That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species, farther evident from Spirits.
12. Whereof there are probably numberless Species.
13. The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.
14—18. Difficulties against a certain number of real Essences.
19. Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of Properties.
21. But such a Collection as our Name stands for.
22. Our abstract Ideas are to us the measures of Species, instance in that of Man.
23. Species not distinguished by Generation.
24. Distinguishing them by substantial Forms, not pretended to but in this part of the World. Substances distinguished into Species, by their obvious appearances before substantial Forms were thought of.
25. The specifick Essences are made by the Mind.
26. Therefore very various and uncertain.
27. But not so arbitrarily as mixed Modes.
28. Though very imperfect.
29. Which yet serves for common Converse.
30. But makes several Essences signified by the same Name.
31. The more general our Ideas are, the more incompleat and partial they are.
32. This all accommodated to the end of Speech.
33. Instance in Cassuaries.
34. Men make the Species instance Gold.
35. Though Nature make the Similitude.
36. And continues it in the races of Things.
37. Each abstract Idea is an Essence.
38. Genera and Species, in order to naming, instance watch.
39. Species of artificial Things less confused than natural.
40. Artificial Things of distinct Species.
41. Substances alone have proper Names.
42. Difficulty to treat of Words with Words.
43, 44. Instance of mixed Modes in Kineah and Niouph..
45, 46. Instance of Substances in Zahab.
47. Their Ideas imperfect, and therefore various.
48. Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed.
49. Which Supposition is of no use.
50. Conclusion.

CHAP. VII.
Of Particles:

SECT.

1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.
2. In them consists the art of well speaking.
3, 4. They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.
5. Instance in But.
6. This Matter but lighly touched here.

CHAP. VIII.
Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

SECT.

1. Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.
2. They shew the difference of our Ideas.

CHAP. IX.
Of the Imperfection of Words.

SECT.

1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.
2. Any Words will serve for recording.
3. Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical.
4. The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.
5. Causes of their Imperfection.
6. The Names of mixed Modes doubtful. First, because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.
7. Secondly, Because they have no Standards.
8. Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.
9. The way of Learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.
10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.
12. First, To real Essences that cannot be known.
13, 14. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.
15. With this Imperfection, they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical use.
16. Instance Liquor of Nerves.
17. Instance Gold.
18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.
19. And next to them simple Modes.
20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances.
21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words.
22, 23. This should teach us Moderation, in imposing our own Sense of old Authors.

CHAP. X.
Of the Abuse of Words.

SECT.

1. Abuse of Words.
2, 3. First, Words without any, or without Ideas.
4. Occasioned by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to.
5. Secondly, Unsteady Application of them.
6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.
7. Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this.
8. Calling it Subtilty.
9. This Learning very little benefited Society.
10. But destroy'd the Instruments of Knowledge and Communication.
11. As useful as to confound the sound of the Letters.
12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.
13. And ought not to pass for Learning.
14. Fourthly, Abuse, taking them for Things.
15. Instance in Matter.
16. This makes Errors lasting.
17. Fifthly, Abuse setting them for what they cannot signifie.
18. V. g. putting them for the real Essences of Substances.
19. Hence we think every change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Specie.
20. The Cause of this Abuse, a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.
21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions.
22. Sixthly, Abuse, a Supposition that Words have a certain and evident signification.
23. The Ends of Language, First, To convey our Ideas.
24. Secondly, to doe it with quickness.
25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things.
26—31. How Men's Words fail in all these,
32. How in Substances.
33. How in Modes and Relations.
34. Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

CHAP. XI.
Of the Remedies of the fore-going Imperfection and Abuses.

SECT.

1. They are worth seeking.
2. Are not easie.
3. But yet necessary to Philosophy.
4. Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.
5. Obstinacy.
6. And Wrangling.
7. Instance Bat and Bird.
8. First, Remedy to use no Word without an Idea.
9. Secondly, Have distinct Ideas annexed to them in Modes.
10. And distinct and conformable in Substances.
11. Thirdly, Propriety.
12. Fourthly, To make known their meaning.
13. And that three ways.
14. First, In simple Ideas by synonymous terms or shewing.
15. Secondly, in mixed Modes by definition.
16. Morality capable of Demonstration.
17. Definitions can make moral Discourses clear.
18. And is the only way.
19. Thirdly, In Substances, by shewing and defining.
20, 21, Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.
22. The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.
23. A Reflexion on the Knowledge of Spirits.
24. Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to Things.
25. Not easie to be made so.
26. Fifthly, Remedy, Constancy in their signification.
27. Where it ought to be explained, when varied.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.
Of Knowledge in general.

SECT.

1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.
2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.
3. This Agreement four-fold.
4. First, of Identity or Diversity.
5. Secondly, Relative.
6. Thirdly, of Co-existence.
7. Fourthly, of real Existence.
8. Knowledge actual or habitual.
9. Habitual Knowledge two-fold.

CHAP. II.
Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Intuitive.
2. Demonstrative.
3. Depends on Proofs.
4. But not so easie.
5. Not without precedent doubt.
6. Not so clear.
7. Each step must have intuitive Evidence.
8. Hence the mistake, ex praecognitis, & praeconcessis.
9. Demonstration not limited to quantity.
10—13. Why it has been so thought.
14. Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.
15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas are so.

CHAP. III.
Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

SECT.

1. First, No farther than we have Ideas.
2. Secondly, No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Disagreement.
3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends it self not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.
4. Fourthly, Nor demonstrative Knowledge.
5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.
6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas.
7. How far our Knowledge reaches.
8. First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity, as far as our Ideas.
9. Secondly, Of Co-existence a very little way.
10. Because the connexion between most simple Ideas is unknown.
11. Especially of Secondary Qualities.
12—14. And farther, because all connexion between any secondary and primary Qualities is undiscoverable.
15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger.
16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.
17. Of the Spirits yet narrower.
18. Thirdly, Of other Relations it is not easie to say how far. Morality capable of Demonstration.
19. Two Things have made moral Ideas thought uncapable of Demonstration. Their Complexedness, and want of sensible Representations.
20. Remedies of those Difficulties.
21. Fourthly, of real Existence we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensible of some few other Things.
22. Our Ignorance great.
23. First, One Cause of it want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not.
24. Because of their Remoteness, or,
25. Because of their Minuteness.
26. Hence no Science of Bodies.
27. Much less of Spirits.
28. Secondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between Ideas we have.
29. Instances.
30. Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.
31. Extent in respect of Universality.

CHAP. IV.
Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare Vision.
2, 3. Answer, Not so, where Ideas agree with Things.
4. As, First, All simple Ideas do.
5. Secondly, All complex Ideas, except of Substances.
6. Hence the Reality of mathematical Knowledge.
7. And of moral.
8. Existence not required to make it real.
9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.
10. Mis-naming disturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledge.
11. Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us.
12. So far as they agree with those, so far our Knowledge concerning them is real.
13. In our Enquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not consine our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.
14—17. Objection against a Changeling, being something between Man and Beast answered.
18. Recapitulation.

CHAP. V.
Of Truth in General

SECT.

1. What Truth is.
2. A right joining, or separating of Signs; i.e. Ideas or Words.
3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions.
4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but the joining, or separating Ideas without Words.
6. When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal Truth, that it may be thus alchimerical.
8. Answered real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.
9. Falshood is the joining of Names otherwise than their Ideas agree.
10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical Truth.

CHAP. VI.
Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.
2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of Truth and of Knowledge.
4. No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mentioned is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns Substances.
6. The Truth of few universal Propositions concerning Substances, is to be known.
7. Because Co-existence of Ideas in few Cases to be known.
8, 9. Instance in Gold.
10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal Propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,
11, 12. The Qualities, which make our complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes.
13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledge.
14. What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.
15. Whilst our Ideas of Substances contain not their real Constitutions, we can make but few general certain Propositions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions.

CHAP. VII.
Of Maxims.

SECT.

1. They are self-evident.
2. Wherein that Self-evidence consists.
3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received Axioms.
4. First, As to Identity and Diversity, all Propositions are equally self-evident.
5. Secondly, In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.
6. Thirdly, In other Relations we may have.
7. Fourthly, Concerning real Existence we have none.
8. These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.
9, 10. Because they are not the Truths the first known.
11. What use these general Maxims have.
12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of Words, may prove contradictions.
13. Instance in Vacuum.
14. They prove not the Existence of Things without us.
15. Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.
16—18. Instance in Man.
19. Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and distinct Ideas.
20. Their use dangerous where our Ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII.
Of Trifling Propositions.

SECT.

1. Some Propositions bring no increase to our Knowledge.
2, 3. As First, Identical Propositions.
4. Secondly, When a part of any complex Idea is predicated of the whole.
5. As part of the definition of the defined.
6. Instance Man and Palfry.
7. For this teaches but the signification of Words.
8. But no real Knowledge.
9. General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.
10. And why.
11. Thirdly, Using Words variously, is trifling with them.
12. Marks of verbal Propositions, First, Predication in abstract.
13. Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any term.

CHAP. IX.
Of our Knowledge of Existence.

SECT.

1. General certain Propositions concern not Existence.
2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence.
3. Our Knowledge of our own Existence is intuitive.

CHAP. X.
Of the Existence of a GOD.

SECT.

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a GOD.
2. Man knows that he himself is.
3. He knows also, that Nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore something eternal.
4. That eternal Being must be most powerful.
5. And most knowing.
6. And therefore GOD.
7. Our Idea of a most perfect Being not the sole proof of a GOD.
8. Something from Eternity.
9. Two sorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.
10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.
11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.
13. Whether material or no.
14. Not material, First, Because every particle of Matter is not cogitative.
15. Secondly, One particle alone of Matter, cannot be cogitative.
16. Thirdly, A System of incogitative Matter, cannot be cogitative.
17. Whether in motion, or at rest.
18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

CHAP. XI.
Of the Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

SECT.

1. Is to be had only by Sensation.
2. Instance whiteness of this Paper.
3. This though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us.
4. First, Because we cannot have them but by the inlet of the Senses.
5. Because an Idea from actual Sensation, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.
6. Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.
7. Fourthly, Our Senses assist one another's Testimony of the Existence of outward Things.
8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.
9. But reaches no farther than actual Sensation.
10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing.
11. Past Existence is known by Memory.
12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable.
13. Particular Propositions concerning Existence are knowable.
14. And general Propositions concerning abstract Ideas.

CHAP. XII.
Of the improvement of our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from Maxims.
2. (The occasion of that Opinion.)
3. But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas.
4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.
5. This no certain way to Truth.
6. But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steddy Names.
7. The true method of advancing Knowledge, is by considering our abstract Ideas.
8. By which, Morality also may be made clearer.
9. But Knowledge of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience.
10. This may procure us convenience, not Science.
11. We are fitted for moral Knowledge, and natural Improvements.
12. But must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles.
13. The true use of Hypotheses.
14. Clear and distinct Ideas with setled Names, and the finding of those which shew their agreement, or disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledge.
15. Mathematicks an instance of it.

CHAP. XIII.
Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Our Knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.
2. The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.
3. Instances in Numbers.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Judgment.

SECT.

1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.
2. What use to be made of this twilight Estate.
3. Judgment supplies the want of Knowledge.
4. Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it.

CHAP. XV.
Of Probability.

SECT.

1. Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs.
2. It is to supply the want of Knowledge.
3. Being that which makes us presume things to be true, before we know them to be so.
4. The grounds of Probability are two; conformity with our own Experience, or the Testimony of others Experience.
5. In this all the agreements pro and con ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment.
6. They being capable of great variey

CHAP. XVI.
Of the Degrees of Assent.

SECT.

1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of Probability.
2. These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content our selves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of Assent.
3. The ill consequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.
4. The right use of it is mutual Charity and forbearance.
5. Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation.
6. The concurrent experience of all other Men with ours, produces assurance approaching to Knowledge.
7. Inquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence.
8. Fair Testimony, and the nature of the Thing indifferent, produces also confident belief.
9. Experiences and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of Probability.
10. Traditional Testimonies, the more more their removed, the less their Proof.
11. Yet History is of great use.
12. In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.
13. One case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony.
14. The bare Testimony of Revelation is the highest certainty.

CHAP. XVII.
Of Reason.

SECT.

1. Various significations of the word Reason.
2. Wherein Reasoning consists.
3. Its four parts.
4. Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason.
5. Helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.
6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but fence with it.
7. Other helps should be sought.
8. We Reason about Particulars.
9. First, Reason fails us for want of Ideas.
10. Secondly, Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas.
11. Thirdly, For want of intermediate Ideas.
12. Fourthly, Because of wrong Principles:
13. Fifthly, Because of doubtful terms.
14. Our highest degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning.
15. The next is Demonstration by reasoning.
16. To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable reasoning.
17. Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment.
18. Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas.
19. Four sorts of Arguments: First, Ad Verecundiam.
20. Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam.
21. Thirdly, Ad Hominem.
22. Fourthly, Ad Judicium.
23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason.
24. Reason and Faith not opposite.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

SECT.

1. Necessary to know their Boundaries.
2. Faith and Reason what, as contradistinguished.
3. No new simple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Revelation.
4. Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same certainty that Reason doth.
5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason.
6. Traditional Revelation much less.
7. Things above Reason.
8. Or not contrary to Reason, if revealed, are matter of Faith.
9. Revelation, in matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.
10. In matters where Reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened to.
11. If the boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm, or extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.

CHAP. XIX.
Of Wrong Assent, or Errour.

SECT.

1. Causes of Errour.
2. First, Want of Proofs.
3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them, answered.
4. People hindred from Enquiry.
5. Secondly, Want of skill to use them.
6. Thirdly, Want of Will to use them.
7. Fourthly, Wrong measures of Probability, whereof.
8—10. First, Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.
11. Secondly, Received Hypothesis.
12. Thirdly, predominant Passions.
13. The means of evading Probabilities, 1st. Supposed fallacy.
14. 2dly. Supposed Arguments for the contrary.
15. What Probabilities determine the Assent.
16. Where it is in our power to suspend it.
17. Fourthly, Authority.
18. Men not in so many Errours as is imagined.

CHAP. XX.
Division of the Sciences.

SECT.

1. Three sorts.
2. First, Physica.
3. Secondly, Practica.
4. Thirdly, Σημιωτική.
5. This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge.

FINIS.